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Abstract
In this article, I trace organizational sociology’s inabil-
ity to develop a comprehensive framework integrating struc-
ture, agency and environment to the persistence of essential-
ism within the ecological tradition and nominalism within the
constructivist tradition.  Drawing on parallels with the
Darwinian revolution, I argue that these impasses can be
overcome through a combination of population thinking and
a relational approach to categorization.  This combination
provides the metatheoretical foundation for an “ecology of
social action” which merges organizational ecology and
resource mobilization theory’s insights into structure-envi-
ronment interactions with constructivists’attention to agency,
language, culture and power.  The concept of a socially con-
structed adaptive landscape is put forward as a central
metaphor for linking the ecological and constructivist tradi-
tions.
Keywords: organizational ecology, constructivism,
agency, essentialism, nominalism
Introduction
An inability to capture the dialectic between structure,
agency and environment has plagued organizational sociolo-
gy from its inception.  Reed (1988, 42) argues that this prob-
lem can only be resolved within an historical framework that
focuses “on those social practices through which social struc-
tures are created, maintained and transformed over time.” At
first glance, organizational ecology’s evolutionary account of
social change seems ideally suited to this task. However,
organizational ecology has not only failed to provide the
needed synthesis.  If anything, it has driven the rhetorical
wedge between structure and agency and macro and micro
perspectives even deeper. 
In order to set their new paradigm apart from so-called
“adaptationist” theories, Hannan and Freeman (1977)
premised organizational ecology on the assumption that
organizations are largely inert relative to the speed of envi-
ronmental change.  While the inertia metaphor initially
served as an effective counterpoise to managerial theorists’
nearly exclusive reliance on rational choice to account for
organizational change, the limitations of this metaphor have
now become apparent. As critics point out, organizational
ecologists have simply constructed an inverted image of man-
agerial omnipotence — a theoretical framework in which
individual and corporate actors are incapable of significantly
modifying themselves or their environments (Fombrun 1988;
Meyer 1990; Winter 1990; Zucker 1989). 
In contrast, constructivist theorists (e.g., Snow et al.
1986) have succeeded precisely where organizational ecolo-
gists have fallen short.  By focusing on the rhetorical and
claims-making activities of individual and corporate actors,
constructivists have exposed the historical and contested
character of intra- and inter-organizational relations and
demonstrated that actors, and the alternative meanings they
espouse, can play an independent causal role in history.
However, although they have made significant advances in
integrating agency and culture into organizational analysis,
constructivists have thus far failed to connect their insights to
a broader theory of organizational dynamics (Musolf 1992).
The complementary strengths and limitations of the eco-
logical and constructivist traditions suggest the need for a
synthesis.  However, achieving such a synthesis requires
placing these traditions within a broader theoretical and
philosophical context. Drawing upon parallels with the
Darwinian revolution, I argue that the primary obstacle to
merging these perspectives is the persistence of essentialism
within the ecological tradition and nominalism within the
constructivist tradition. Moreover, the key to overcoming
these impasses is to combine population thinking with a rela-
tional approach to categorization. This combination provides
the metatheoretical foundation for an “ecology of social
action” which integrates organizational ecology and resource
mobilization theory’s insights into structure-environment
interactions with constructivists’ attention to agency, lan-
guage, culture and power. The concept of a socially con-
structed adaptive landscape is put forward as a central
metaphor for linking the ecological and constructivist tradi-
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USA1tions. In the final section of the paper, I discuss the implica-
tions of this revised version of organizational ecology for the
study of the origins, legitimation and diversification of orga-
nizational forms.
From Frame-Invariant to 
Frame-Relative Thinking 
The Essentialist Roots of Western Science 
The inability of social theorists to come to grips with the
interrelationships between structure, agency and environment
can best be understood in terms of the legacy of essentialism
in the social sciences and the divergent reactions engendered
by that legacy.  Essentialist theorists from Tylor, Morgan,
Marx, Durkheim and Spencer to twentieth-century advocates
of “functionalism” and “evolutionism” all share a commit-
ment to Aristotle’s Natural State Model (NSM). In his
Physics, Aristotle writes:
...natural things are exactly those which do move
continuously, in virtue of a principle inherent in
themselves, towards a determined goal; and the
final development which results from any one such
principle is not identical for any two species, nor
yet is it any random result; but in each there is
always a tendency towards an identical result if
nothing interferes with the process.
(as quoted in Bock 1978, 43) 
Whether applied to physics, biology or politics, Aristotle’s
approach to theory construction involves: (1) defining a class
of objects so that each and every member of that class and
only members of that class possess certain “essential” char-
acteristics, (2) defining the “natural” state or path of change
characteristic of members of that class and (3) distinguishing
these internally generated “natural” tendencies from “devia-
tions” caused by external “obstacles” or “interfering forces.”
Aristotle’s model represents a frame-invariant approach to
theory construction because its goal is to analytically strip
away the effects of external forces in order to uncover con-
text-independent universal patterns (Sober 1980). 
Early chemists’ formulation of the periodic table and
Newton’s “laws of motion” were both products of successful
essentialist research programs (Sober 1980).  They were suc-
cessful because researchers in these fields were able to theo-
rize “interfering forces” — e.g., the effects of friction on
falling bodies — to systematically account for observed
“deviations.” Such successes clearly undermine any attempt
to construct a global anti-essentialist argument (e.g., Popper
1972). They likewise undercut Bock’s (1956) contention that
the NSM does not allow for a “science” of the “accidental.”
These points are crucial for understanding the strengths and
limitations of this doctrine because they belie the common
charges that essentialism is inherently ahistorical, determin-
istic or non-scientific. In principle it is none of these. It only
becomes so in practice when theorists in a given field fail to
construct systematic theories of obstacles. It is this domain-
specific, rather than global, failure that explains the historical
demise of essentialism in biology.  A clear understanding of
why essentialism was abandoned in biology can shed new
light upon the ongoing collapse of essentialism in the social
sciences. Moreover, it also points to an alternative framework
for constructing theories of social change — population
thinking.
The Breakdown of Essentialism in Biology 
The breakdown of essentialism in biology was a com-
plex process spanning at least two centuries.  The essentialist
belief that each species had a distinct and fixed nature first
came under attack in the 18th century.  Nominalists such as
Bonnet and Robinet (Lovejoy 1936; Mayr 1976) contended
that “All groupings, all classes, are artifacts of the human
mind” and that, therefore, only individuals are “real” (Mayr
1976, 429).  This blurring of species boundaries was rein-
forced in the minds of some naturalists — e.g., Buffon — by
a commitment to Aristotle’s principle of continuity — the
belief that species grade imperceptibly one into another
(Lovejoy 1936).  Both of these ideas suggested that species
were merely the arbitrary constructions of human observers.
The growing conviction, in the minds of some naturalists,
that species boundaries were “vague” and/or that species
lacked fixed essences provided a first step towards theories of
species transformation.2
The first theories of biological “evolution” were merely
“temporalized” versions of the Chain of Being (Lovejoy
1936).  That is, the originally static scale of nature — the uni-
linear sequence believed to extend from the least to the most
complex organism — was reinterpreted towards the end of
the 18th century as a process occurring in time.  Such theo-
ries of biological progress were essentialist in that they 
posited a context independent natural path of change with 
the environment treated as a secondary interfering force.
Lamarck’s theory of evolution is perhaps the best-known
example of this approach to theorizing biological change.
However, the inability of Lamarck and other biologists to
construct convincing theories of obstacles — e.g., Lamarck’s
theory of use and disuse (Ruse 1979, 8) — eventually under-
mined attempts to build theories of biological evolution based
on Aristotle’s NSM.
Darwin eventually overcame these difficulties by reject-
ing essentialism in favor of population thinking (Mayr 1976).
That is, rather than seeing variation as merely “deviations”
from some fixed ideal, Darwin took it as his theoretical start-
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ing point.3 Darwin likewise abandoned the essentialist belief
in a context-independent “natural” path to evolution.  Instead,
he used his theory of natural selection to argue that the dif-
ferential survival of variants within a population would even-
tually lead to divergences in character and adaptation to local
conditions. Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton, underscored
this radical shift to population thinking by renaming the “law
of errors” the “normal” curve (Sober 1980).4 That is, prior to
the Darwinian revolution essentialists saw this curve as use-
ful because it provided a methodology for separating the
“natural” from the “accidental.” One need only plot data on
a particular phenomenon and ascend the curve to find the
mean.  For essentialists it was this ideal — e.g., the “nature”
possessed by each member of a species — that was causally
efficacious and thus explanatory.  Diversity was neither. It
was simply a side effect — i.e., “errors” made by nature in
attempting to reproduce a prototype.  Such “errors” were
“explained or explained away” through reference to interfer-
ing forces (Sober 1980, 370). In contrast, Darwin and subse-
quent populationists attempted to account for patterns of
diversity in one time period through reference to earlier pat-
terns of diversity. From the perspective of populationists, the
diversity represented by the bell curve was now seen as “nor-
mal,” not only because it was found everywhere in nature, but
because existing diversity was seen as a cause of subsequent
diversity. As Sober (1980, 370) notes, “Rather than looking
for a reality that underlies diversity, the populationist can
postulate a reality sustained by diversity.”
Thus, in contrast to the NSM, Darwin’s approach to the-
ory construction is frame-relative because it abandons
Aristotle’s goal of partitioning the natural from the acciden-
tal.  From the perspective of evolutionary theory, such a par-
titioning is considered impossible even in principle (Sober
1980). For instance, at the ontogenetic level a gene quite lit-
erally has no “meaning” except in relation to a specific
genomic and environmental context. Likewise, at the phylo-
genetic level changes in diversity in successive time periods
can only be explained through reference to intervening envi-
ronments (Sober 1980). Thus, biologists have replaced the
twin essentialist problematics of analytically separating
“nature” from “nurture” and the “ahistorical” from “histori-
cal” elements of evolution in favor of more interesting frame-
relative questions, such as constructing norms of reaction
which graph the alternative developmental outcomes of a
given genotype across varying environments (e.g., the height
of a single corn genotype as a function of different levels of
soil nitrogen) or niche theories which predict a population’s
optimal niche width in relation to specific patterns of envi-
ronmental change. 
Finally, although Darwin ([1859] 1958, 67) himself
never entirely overcame his conviction that the term
“species” was “arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience,”
the subsequent history of biology has demonstrated that the
choice between essentialism and nominalism is a false one
(Mayr 1976).  Both have been supplanted by a biological
species concept that defines species as bounded networks, the
boundaries of which are delimited by a lack of exchange of
genetic information. Darwin’s confusion derived from the
erroneous assumption that categories had to be “fixed” in
order to be “real” (Sober 1980). A biological species concept
cuts through this false dichotomy. While in the early stages of
speciation the differences between varieties are ambiguous,
and thus purely “nominal,” as boundaries to genetic exchange
form distinct and non-arbitrary species emerge. Such a rela-
tional concept of species escapes the twin horns of the essen-
tialist versus nominalist dilemma by being historical yet 
realist.
The Breakdown of Essentialism in the Social Sciences
Essentialist social theorists have met with the same dif-
ficulties as their earlier counterparts in biology.  As noted
above, until recently virtually all theories of social “evolu-
tion” have been predicated on Aristotle’s NSM. As in the bio-
logical case, the complexity of social history requires that
theorists employing this framework construct systematic the-
ories of “obstacles” to account for “deviations” from predict-
ed “natural” paths of change. In the absence of such ancillary
theories, accounting for the relationship between social struc-
ture and environment (physical, biological or social) becomes
impossible within an essentialist framework because it is a
theory of obstacles which provides the mapping between the
uniformity of hypothesized natural states and the diversity of
actual historical experience. Marxian theorists’ inability to
explain the persistence of the family farm (McLaughlin 1998)
and functionalists’unsuccessful attempts to explain change in
terms of “flexibilities and strains” (Bock 1956) are just two
examples of this recurrent failure.  Moreover, in contrast to
biologists, social scientists must account for the role of
human agency in history. Essentialists have had even less
success addressing this question. Typically, actual agents on
the historical stage are replaced with puppets whose move-
ments are dictated by the strings of a closed conceptual sys-
tem (Dally 1991).
Essentialists’ inability to clarify the interrelationships
between structure, agency and environment has led to a num-
ber of divergent reactions within twentieth-century social 
science.  For instance, theorists in the ecological tradition —
ecological anthropology, organizational ecology, evolution-
ary economics — have abandoned the NSM, attempting
instead to explain the relationship between social structure
and environment by employing various concepts of adapta-
tion — e.g., homeostasis, development, rational choice andMcLaughlin
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population thinking (Toulmin 1981).  Sociologists in the con-
structivist tradition have likewise rejected the NSM but have
moved towards a focus on culture and language in order to
address the complexities of human agency. However, each of
these traditions has reached an impasse precisely at the point
where it fails to deal with the other’s concerns.
The Ecological Tradition
In the following discussion, I will focus on organiza-
tional ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1989) to illustrate both
the strengths and limitations of the ecological tradition.
Organizational ecology is one of a number of populational
accounts of social change to have recently emerged within
various subdisciplines of the social sciences — e.g., human
ecology (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Dietz, Burns and Buttel
1990), economics (Nelson and Winter 1982), political sci-
ence (Ostrom 2000) and philosophy (Jensen and Harre 1981).
However, of these, organizational ecology has generated the
most sustained program of empirical research and thus will
be taken as an exemplar of the ecological tradition.
Seen within the context of the history of organizational
sociology, organizational ecology represents the culmination
of a shift from “closed” to “open” systems theories that began
within this field in the early 1960’s (Scott 1987).  Underlying
this transition is the same radical inversion of philosophic
assumptions that occurred in the course of the Darwinian 
revolution — i.e., a shift from frame-invariant to frame-rela-
tive thinking. 
Prior to 1960, organizational theorists took it for granted
that the first step in theory construction was to identify the
“essential” characteristics of all organizations or a limited
number of organizational “types.” The central analytical task
for these theorists was to derive the theoretical implications
of such classifications. For instance, Frederick Taylor
assumed that “rationality” was an essential feature of all
organizations and proceeded to derive propositions regarding
the nature of control arrangements and reward systems based
on this definition. Likewise, Parson’s AGIL scheme was
premised on the classification of all organizations into cate-
gories based on the functional “need” — i.e., adaptation, goal
attainment, integration and latency — that they serve.  The
difficulty with such typologies is that they explain neither the
origins of the organizational types posited nor how diversity
within or between types was subsequently modified by envi-
ronmental circumstances (Scott 1987). In short, closed sys-
tem theorists lacked a systematic theory of obstacles. 
In the 1960’s, theorists such as Stinchcombe (1965) and
Thompson (1967) abandoned the search for essential charac-
teristics and began focusing on organizational diversity and
processes of adaptation.  As Thompson (1967, vii) observed:
No useful theory can rest on the assumption that
everything is unique.  It is probably inevitable that
the early history of a scientific endeavor will be
characterized by the opposite assumption, and by
the search for universals.  This certainly has been
the case with organization theory, which until
recently has been preoccupied with discovering the
essential elements of all complex organizations.
I believe it is a sign of relative maturity when a field
begins to focus on patterned variations (emphasis
mine).
Organizational ecologists have taken this trend toward open
systems thinking to its logical conclusion.  Rather than pos-
tulating a context-independent “natural” path to organiza-
tional evolution, they have attempted to follow Darwin’s lead
by conceptualizing change in populational terms as a contin-
uous interaction between variation and context and by seeing
organizational categories not as preexisting abstractions but
rather as outcomes of historical processes (Hannan and
Freeman 1986). The result has been a rich and rapidly
expanding research program on the demography, population
ecology and community ecology of organizations. 
Yet, organizational ecology’s undeniable success has
been bought at the price of an overly structuralist and thinly
historical account of social change (Zucker 1989).  The iner-
tia metaphor has restricted organizational ecologists’focus to
the ecological level of analysis and precluded any serious
consideration of the interpretive processes by which individ-
ual and corporate actors perceive their surroundings and act
on those perceptions to continuously construct and recon-
struct themselves and their environments (Fombrun 1988).
Moreover, by treating actors as passive, by reifying social
environments as “natural” and by not adequately addressing
questions of power and conflict, organizational ecologists
have left themselves open to charges of conservative bias
(Perrow 1986). The inertia metaphor has likewise impeded
attempts to build bridges to other open system theories that
employ homeostatic, developmental or rational modes of
adaptive explanation (Meyer 1990).  By labeling these “adap-
tationist” and opposing them to population thinking (e.g.,
Hannan 1986), organizational ecologists needlessly perpetu-
ate social scientists’ tendency to treat these various mecha-
nisms as competing rather than complementary forms of
explanation (Toulmin 1981). Such difficulties are compound-
ed by an overly positivist style of research and a concomitant
neglect of thick historical description and substantive rele-
vance (Baum and Powell 1995). Organizational ecologists
have thus undermined their own stated goal (Hannan and
Freemen 1989) of readdressing the broader theoretical, his-
torical and political concerns of the classical theorists.McLaughlin
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Resource mobilization theory exhibits a similar set of
strengths and limitations.  Paralleling the shift from closed to
open systems thinking in organizational sociology, resource
mobilization theorists (e.g., Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and
Zald 1977; Tilly 1978) have abandoned earlier “breakdown”
models that conceptualized social movements as “deviations”
from some “normal” path of development, focusing instead
on  frame-relative questions involving the intersection of
organizational strategy and resources.  However, despite their
greater attention to historical context, power and conflict,
resource mobilization theorists have failed to adequately
address questions of agency, ideology and grievance interpre-
tation (Klandermans 1992). In McCarthy and Zald’s (1977)
case, these limitations derive directly from a reliance on
essentialistic assumptions about “rational” actors (Ferree and
Miller 1985). As Buechler (1993) notes, using such simplify-
ing psychological assumptions runs the risk of treating par-
ticipants and movements who do not fit this model as
“deviant.” While organizational ecologists make no specific
assumptions about “human nature,” their importation of the
inertia metaphor from Newtonian mechanics has led to a sim-
ilar set of difficulties.
The Constructivist Tradition
One route to recapturing the broader agenda premature-
ly surrendered by organizational ecology is to build stronger
theoretical bridges to the constructivist tradition.  Construc-
tivists have reacted to essentialists’ failure to address human
agency by reconceptualizing social categories, not as univer-
sal and invariant, but rather as cultural conventions that are
negotiated and contested by actors situated within particular
historical contexts (Donati 1992). Such interconnected sets of
socially constructed categories or “frames” provide a basis
for forging shared meanings and coordinating social action. 
The constructivist tradition has generated a compelling
set of perspectives linking agency, language, culture and
power.  However, although it has succeeded precisely where
the ecological tradition has fallen short, the constructivist tra-
dition has failed to adequately theorize the dynamics of social
structure. A principal cause of this failure is the tension
between nominalism and realism which constructivism inher-
ited from pragmatism (Ritzer 1992). While early construc-
tivists, such as Schutz, resolved this tension and maintained
the goal of an objective science of subjective meaning by
placing phenomenological brackets around questions of
ontology (Thomason 1982), in recent years constructivism
has taken a decidedly nominalist turn. Thomason (1982) con-
tends that Berger and Luckman (1967) accelerated this shift
by rejecting Schutz’s “ontological agnosticism” in favor of a
view of social categories as merely “reifications.” As Ritzer
(1992, 252) notes, “Berger and Luckman gave absolutely no
sense of the other aspect of reification — i.e., the degree to
which society, as a result of the subjective processes they
describe, objectively comes to acquire a life of its own.”
Radical post-modernists such as Latour (1987) and Woolgar
(1988) have taken this nominalist position to its logical anti-
realist extreme by questioning the intelligibility and even
existence of an “external reality.”
Nevertheless, it would be premature to abandon con-
structivism as a relativist and anti-realist cul-de-sac.  On the
contrary, I argue below that moderate constructivists’ (e.g.,
Snow et al. 1986) insights into agency, language, culture and
power hold the key to filling in the lacunae of organizational
ecology and resource mobilization theory. Moreover, even
radical post-modernists may unwittingly be contributing to a
new science of society.  By focusing on the socially unique
and idiosyncratic, on life on the margins, by substituting local
for grand narratives, in short, by making “normal” what from
a modernist perspective is merely “deviant,” radical construc-
tivists are driving the final nails in the coffin of essentialism.
Shifting the starting point of theory construction from
“essential” characteristics and “natural” paths of change to
variation and diversity was precisely the role that nominalism
played in the Darwinian revolution.
Towards a Populational Theory of Social Change
The historical parallels with the Darwinian revolution
suggest a way out of the current impasse in the social sci-
ences.  Although radical post-modernists remain wedded to a
deconstructionist project, other theorists increasingly recog-
nize the need to stake out a middle ground between essen-
tialist-based objectivism and nominalist-induced relativism
(Bourdieu 1985).  For example, Brown (1990) has discussed
what he calls “symbolic realism,” while Rorty (1991) has
elaborated a related neo-pragmatist position. More recently,
Rosa (1998) has developed the notion of “reconstructed real-
ism” in relation to questions of risk.
I believe that this emerging consensus reflects two
assumptions.  First, it represents an acknowledgment that
“even if reality is symbolically constructed, some construc-
tions are surely preferable to others” (Simons 1990, 22). If
such preferences are systematically related to the physical,
biological and social environments in which specific social
constructions are instantiated, then processes of variation,
selection and retention may provide a mechanism by which
alternative constructions are perpetuated or sifted from the
historical stream. Such a position is consistent in spirit, if not
detail, with an evolutionary perspective on social change. In
fact, it is not difficult to find incipient forms of population
thinking within constructivism. West (1985) provides such an
analysis of Weber, while Rorty (1991) notes the parallels
between Darwinism and pragmatism. Likewise, the theory ofMcLaughlin
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cultural change that Lyman (1990) claims to have “discov-
ered” in Goffman, by his own accounting, amounts to noth-
ing more than variation, selection and retention.
The second element of this emerging consensus is the
reconceptualization of social categories in relational rather
than essentialist or nominalist terms (Bourdieu 1985).  Like
biologists, many social scientists are beginning to treat cate-
gories as bounded networks. Such an historical yet realist
approach to categorization has always been implicit within
constructivism. Perhaps the best example is Weber’s (1946,
187) definition of a status group as a “style of life” which
places “restrictions on ‘social’ intercourse.” However, the
strong nominalist undercurrents within constructivism have
continually driven adherents of this tradition onto the twin
horns of the same dilemma that plagued pre-Darwinian biol-
ogists — i.e., assuming that categories are either fixed or not
real.  As Mayr (1976, 288) notes, it was precisely this “wrong
choice of alternatives” — i.e., between essentialism and nom-
inalism - that was the major obstacle to the Darwinian revo-
lution.  This same false dichotomy pervades the radical con-
structivist literature. Woolgar (1988) makes precisely this
mistake when he concludes that the failure of sociologists of
“science” to find some stable, invariant object underlying the
historically variable activities given this label leaves nomi-
nalism as the only coherent alternative. Even Thomason
(1982, 89), in defending Schutz’s ontological agnosticism,
falls into this trap when he concludes that Schutz’s “approach
is constructivist, nonetheless, and does, therefore, assume
that the ‘things’ which are reified are ‘really’ not ‘things.’”
Conceptualizing social categories as bounded networks
will cut through this false dichotomy, just as it did in biolo-
gy, while maintaining constructivism’s central insight that
social categories are historically fluid and manipulable by
human agency.  When extracted from a nominalist framework
the constructivist metaphor becomes a powerful tool for
understanding social change and the sense in which subjec-
tive processes come to acquire an objective “life of their
own” becomes readily intelligible — i.e., purely arbitrary
social and ideological contrasts such as race or class become
distinct categories to the extent that they provide a basis for
well-defined networks of social interaction.  When bound-
aries between such networks form, the frequencies of social
rules, idiosyncratic language and culture on respective sides
of the boundary typically diverge (Burns and Dietz 1992).
Not surprisingly, network theorists have been among the first
to argue that social networks should be seen not just as 
“measurement constructs” but also as “phenomenological
realities” (White 1992, as quoted in Emirbayer and Goodwin
1994, 37). 
To summarize, social scientists can take a major step
towards integrating structure, agency and environment by
fully absorbing the major lessons of the Darwinian revolu-
tion.  That is, they need to reject both essentialism and nom-
inalism and replace them with population thinking and an
historical yet realist approach to categorization (Mayr 1976). 
Beyond the Impasse:
Towards an Ecology of Social Action
The above discussion is intended to provide a metatheo-
retical foundation for an “ecology of social action” which
combines organizational ecology and resource mobilization
theory’s insights into structure-environment interactions with
constructivists’ attention to agency, language, culture and
power.  In fact, the elements for such a synthesis already
exist. Probably the best example of an historical yet realist
approach to organizational taxonomy is Hannan and
Freeman’s (1986) discussion of organizational boundaries.
However, to date, organizational ecologists have failed to
connect this provocative analysis to their populational
accounts of organizational change (Baum and House 1990). I
argue below that this failure can be traced to the reintroduc-
tion of essentialist biases into organizational ecology through
the borrowing of the “inertia” metaphor from Newtonian
mechanics. This metaphor is preventing organizational ecol-
ogists from moving beyond very limited borrowings from
institutional theory (Zucker 1989) to incorporate the more
profound insights of constructivism.
For their part, constructivist theorists have made cri-
tiques of resource mobilization theory that parallel those
made by institutionalists against organizational ecology,
arguing that they focus narrowly on “the how” to the neglect
of “the why” of social dynamics (Zucker 1989).  Construc-
tivists have attempted to correct this imbalance by focusing
on the discursive practices used by individual and corporate
actors to transform social networks and boundaries. Never-
theless, while some constructivists recognize the need to see
the social construction of meaning as occurring within an
organizational context (Klandermans 1992), and that framing
activities can impact organizational founding and disbanding
rates (Snow et al. 1986), they have thus far failed to connect
their analyses to a theory of organizational dynamics. 
Clearly, the challenge is to merge these intellectual tra-
ditions so as to readdress the macro-structural concerns of
Marx and Durkheim in a more dynamic and non-essentialist
fashion while retaining Weber and Schutz’s commitment to
an objective science of subjective meaning.  In the following
sections, I argue that such a synthesis can be achieved by: (1)
abandoning Hannan and Freeman’s (1977) inertia metaphor
in favor of an explicit focus on organizational plasticity and
integrating various modes of adaptive explanation, (2) mov-
ing questions of individual and corporate agency and interestMcLaughlin
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to the center stage of ecological analysis and (3) reconceptu-
alizing the legitimation of organizational forms as a process
occurring within the context of a socially constructed adap-
tive landscape and by focusing on the discursive practices
that individual and corporate actors use to manipulate such
landscapes and the boundaries between discrete organiza-
tional networks.
Abandoning the Inertia Metaphor
Several authors have argued that organizational ecolo-
gists’ reliance on the inertia metaphor ignores the adaptive
capacities of organizations (Fombrun 1988; Meyer 1990;
Perrow 1986; Zucker 1989).  Though accurate, these critiques
fail to penetrate to the heart of the problem, which is the inap-
propriateness of grounding an evolutionary theory of organi-
zational change on a concept with essentialist roots.  Al-
though Hannan and Freeman (1989) are careful to define
organizational “inertia” in terms of relative rates of change
rather than “natural tendencies,” the inertia metaphor still
carries with it essentialist overtones derived from its origins
in Newtonian mechanics.5 Importing such a metaphor into an
evolutionary framework allows the developmentalist assump-
tions, which organizational ecologists claim to have aban-
doned (Carroll 1984), to be subtly reintroduced.
Thus, although they avoid making explicit essentialist
assumptions about “rational actors,” organizational ecolo-
gists have used the inertia metaphor as a justification for
“black boxing” questions of agency and interest.  Organi-
zational ecologists’theoretical strategy, in this regard, is sim-
ilar to institutionalists’ “defocalizing” the role of agency in
institutional processes (DiMaggio 1988).  While Hannan and
Freeman (1989, 339) maintain that they are simply construct-
ing theories “that are robust with respect to assumptions
about individual motivation,” in practice this agential agnos-
ticism results in an effective severing of the micro and macro
levels of analysis. Moreover, since questions of meaning and
interests are sidestepped and the internal dynamics of organi-
zations ignored, questions of power and conflict are rarely
addressed (Perrow 1986).
Echoes of Aristotle’s division between the “natural” and
the “accidental” are also apparent in organizational ecolo-
gists’ desire to partition the “ahistorical and historical ele-
ments” of social evolution (Hannan and Freeman 1989, 19)
and in their tendency to “artificially separate organizations
from their environments” (Fombrun 1988, 230).  For in-
stance, with respect to organizational size distributions, orga-
nizational ecologists have failed to differentiate between an
evolutionary approach, which maintains that environmental
heterogeneity may produce bi-modal size distributions, and a
frame-invariant one which treats such an outcome as a uni-
versal, context-independent process — i.e., one which
occurs, as Durkheim insists, “not because external circum-
stances are more varied, but because the struggle for exis-
tence is more acute” (Hannan and Freeman 1989, 125).
Additional essentialist echoes are apparent in organizational
ecologists’ tendency to decontextualize processes of legiti-
mation and competition.  Such processes are treated as “inter-
nal,” “timeless” and “ahistorical,” while “external” historical
factors are relegated to the status of “controls” (Hannan and
Freeman 1989) or ignored altogether in the case of physical
and biological environments. For example, organizational
ecologists have abandoned their earlier concerns with the role
that collective action, the closure of social networks and the
gaining of “insider knowledge” (Marrett 1980) play in the
legitimation process. Instead, legitimation has been reduced
to a “cognitive” process — i.e., increased taken-for-granted-
ness — that is treated as an unmeasured intervening variable
between organizational density and various vital rates.  Thus,
while much of postmodern social science is moving towards
an emphasis on the historical embeddedness of social actors
and processes — what Dally (1991, 90) calls “radical rela-
tionalism” — population ecologists are moving in the oppo-
site direction.  Such a strategy is inconsistent with evolution-
ism and needlessly sacrifices any hope of capturing the
active, contested character of the legitimation process (Baum
and Powell 1995). 
These difficulties could have been avoided simply by
recognizing that inertia is not a necessary component of a
Darwinian theory of change, which requires only three pre-
conditions: (1) variation, (2) selection and (3) retention
(Campbell 1965).  Moreover, the latter should not be mis-
construed as equivalent to inertia (e.g., as in Carroll 1984;
Hannan and Freeman 1977). Even in the biological case, her-
itability is compatible with a wide range of structural and
behavioral plasticity (Scheiner 1993). Recent empirical work
on organizational change has, in fact, begun to move in this
direction, painting a more complex picture in which the
impact of change on organizational fitness depends on orga-
nizational age, size and the frequency, sequencing and type of
changes (Amburgey, Kelly and Barnet 1993; Haveman 1993;
Kelly and Amburgey 1991; Miner, Amburgey and Stearns
1990). However, if organizations vary in their adaptive
capacities and if environments vary in the degree to which
they select for such capacities (Fombrun 1988), then “inertia”
is neither a necessary precondition nor an invariable conse-
quence (Hannan and Freeman 1984) of organizational evolu-
tion. It is simply an empirical question (Winter 1990).
The preceding arguments suggest that “inertia” and
related Newtonian metaphors such as “momentum” (Kelly
and Amburgey 1991) should be abandoned in favor of an
explicit focus on organizational plasticity and integrating 
various modes of adaptive explanation (Toulmin 1981).McLaughlin
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Organizational ecologists’ primary goal should not be to try
to establish which is more important, selection or adaptation,
structure or agency, but rather to integrate these concerns into
“a general theoretical framework which would capture the
dialectical interplay between ‘action’ and ‘structure’ ” (Reed
1988, 35).  Rather than settling for the limited objectivist goal
of building theories that are “robust” with respect to agency
and interests, organizational ecologists need to put such ques-
tions at the center stage of ecological analysis. 
The Centrality of Agency and Interests to
Organizational Evolution 
In contrast to organizational ecology’s current agential
agnosticism, Dietz and Burns (1992) contend that an evolu-
tionary perspective on change actually facilitates the integra-
tion of agency into social theory.  A brief consideration of
Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) recent discussion of agency
supports this claim and highlights the potential affinity
between evolutionary theory and a concern with agency.
Emirbayer and Mische (1998, 963) define agency as:
...a temporally embedded process of social engage-
ment, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect),
but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to
imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the
present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits
and future projects within the contingencies of the
moment).
Emirbayer and Mische’s definition emphasizes that agency is
inherently temporal and thus can only be understood within a
dynamic framework.  The necessity of taking the temporal
dimensions of change seriously is one the hallmarks of evo-
lutionary theorizing (Greenwood 1984). In contrast, essen-
tialist theories, which are rooted in Aristotle’s distinction
between the “natural” and the “accidental,” have been exten-
sively criticized for their tendency to become disconnected
from considerations of time and place (Bock 1956). Although
organizational ecology exhibits some of these latter difficul-
ties, it nevertheless shares with other evolutionary perspec-
tives a commitment to understanding the temporal dimen-
sions of social processes, as evidenced by its extensive use of
event-history methodology.
Emirbayer and Mische (1998, 975) also argue that
agents have the ability “to recall, to select, and to appropri-
ately apply the more or less tacit and taken-for-granted
schemas of action that they have developed through past
experience.” Although this iterational dimension of agency
occurs with little conscious reflection, the proper deployment
of alternative schemas within specific temporal-relational
contexts still requires attention and engagement on the part of
actors. Such a conceptualization of agency is consistent with
an evolutionary perspective. In fact, “heritability” is one of
the three prerequisites of any evolutionary theory (Campbell
1965). As Dietz and Burns (1992) note, social learning
through imitation is much more efficient than trial and error
experimentation. Moreover, they argue that social learning is
an active process, one that always requires some degree of
improvisation on the part of actors. 
Essentialistic theories also contain an iterative dimen-
sion.  However, within such a teleological framework actors’
choices are typically reduced to accelerating or retarding
“natural” developmental trends (Dietz and Burns 1992). The
agentic moment of iteration is thus neglected or ignored.
Rational choice models, which essentialize individual actors,
exhibit similar difficulties (Burns and Dietz 1992). While the
“heritability” of social rules and routines is central to organi-
zational ecology (Hannan and Freeman 1989), the inertia
assumption has led theorists in this tradition to likewise dis-
regard the agentic dimensions of iteration. For example, orga-
nizational ecologists’ strategy of treating legitimacy as an
unmeasured intervening variable — linking density and vital
rates — leads them to gloss over the complex internal and
external projects engaged in by actors to legitimate new orga-
nizational forms.  Similar difficulties are apparent in recent
work on intraorganizational evolution by Burgelman and
Mittman (1994). While these authors concede to managers
some degree of bounded “rationality,” other organizational
participants are treated as passive receptacles for “induced”
or “autonomously” created managerial routines.
According to Emirbayer and Mische, actors also mani-
fest agency through their orientation toward the future and
their ability to imagine alternative possibilities.  Moreover,
they note that social scientists have tended to ignore this pro-
jective dimension of agency due to a perceived incompatibil-
ity between subjective phenomena and “behavioral observa-
tion, survey techniques, and macrostructural analysis”
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 991).  I would argue that social
scientists’ neglect of the projective dimension of agency is
also rooted in the historical dominance of essentialism in the
social sciences.  Within an essentialistic framework, variabil-
ity of any type tends to be discounted as merely “deviations.”
Such theories fail to capture the spontaneous and reflexive
abilities of actors, treating them instead as passively “pro-
grammed” by their respective cultures (Dietz and Burns
1992). In contrast, evolutionary theories take variation as
their theoretical starting point. In fact, Dietz and Burns
(1992) go so far as to suggest that theories of social evolution
may require the concept of agency because agency is the only
mechanism able to produce sufficient variability to make
such a theory viable. 
From an evolutionary perspective, the variability pro-
duced through the creative and even playful engagement ofMcLaughlin
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social actors is inevitably subject to the selective forces pre-
sented by the environment.  The resulting differential propa-
gation of alternative social rules, schemas or forms of orga-
nization produces additional diversity on successive levels of
analysis as networks with different frequencies of these
respective types of variation diverge and rediverge — and
sometimes merge — into discrete networks of social interac-
tion (Burns and Dietz 1992).  As Darwin’s ([1859] 1958)
metaphor of a branching tree suggests, evolution is inherent-
ly multilinear.  While selection within specific environments
may push populations to evolve along particular trajectories,
there is no overall direction to the evolutionary process.
Translated into the social domain, such an open-ended frame-
work is entirely compatible with the notion that actors pursu-
ing alternative imaginative projects can play an indepen-
dent causal role in history.  Successful projects become the
branching points of the socio-historical tree. In contrast,
essentialistic theories, which privilege certain historical tra-
jectories as “natural,” tend to treat peoples and projects that
behave in a manner inconsistent with the hypothesized devel-
opmental trend as deviant or pathological.  Organizational
ecology, because it has focused primarily on the dynamics of
individual organizational populations, has thus far had little
to say about the broader patterns of organizational evolution.
However, I will argue below that confronting this issue will
require organizational ecologists to address the discursive
and claims making activities of individual and corporate
actors directly. 
Finally, Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) approach to
agency underscores the social embeddedness of actors and
their ability to contextualize past patterns of thought and
action and alternative projections of future actions within the
contingencies of current circumstances.  Such a conceptual-
ization of agency is consistent with Dally’s (1991, 90) con-
tention that the social sciences are moving towards a form of
“radical relationalism.” Such a position is completely at vari-
ance with essentialistic theories whose very goal is to decon-
textualize social actors and processes in order to produce
frame-invariant laws (Bock 1956). Organizational ecologists’
reliance on the inertia metaphor has led to a similar tendency
to abstract organizational actors and processes from histori-
cal context. However, as the above discussion of the Darwin-
ian revolution makes clear, evolutionary thinking is premised
upon a commitment to a frame-relative approach to theory
construction (Sober 1980) which insists that the entities
evolving — whether biological species, social rules or orga-
nizations — cannot be divorced from their respective con-
texts.  As Burns and Dietz (1992) note, the necessity of con-
textualizing social action within historically specific physi-
cal, biological and social environments is one of the defining
features of an evolutionary perspective on social change. 
If an “ecology of social action” is to avoid the current
pitfalls of organizational ecology and provide a theoretical
framework that is fully dynamic, open-ended and contextual-
ized, it must studiously avoid the twin traps of reducing indi-
vidual or corporate agents to essentialized “rational actors”
or “ideological dupes” (Donati 1992, 155).  Both of these
traps can be averted by explicitly grounding a revised ecolo-
gy of organizations on a constructivist perspective on agency.
Constructivists conceptualize actors as operating within a
discursive framework, interpreting their experiences in rela-
tion to hierarchical and articulated sets of “frames” which
provide “ ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals
‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within
their life space and the world at large” (Snow et al. 1986,
464). Moreover, alternative frames constitute “tools kits”
used by contending parties to actively construct and decon-
struct social and political reality (Donati 1992). Conceptual-
izing agency in terms of framing processes is consistent with
Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998, 993) definition of agency as
a process of “temporally constructed engagement.” The next
question to be addressed is how such a constructivist per-
spective on agency can be integrated into an evolutionary
account of social structure? In the following section, I devel-
op the concept of a socially constructed adaptive landscape as
the central metaphor for linking the ecological and construc-
tivist traditions.
Organizational Evolution within a Socially Constructed
Adaptive Landscape
In his path-breaking work on forms of control in the
labor process, Edwards (1979) put forward the metaphor of a
“contested terrain” to describe processes of negotiation and
contention within the workplace.  Although Edwards and
other labor process theorists were successful in refocusing
attention on issues of power and conflict, their contribution
was ultimately limited by their commitment to an essentialist
analysis of organizational dynamics. More recently, Bourdieu
(1985), in what he describes as a break with Marxist theory,
has advanced the concept of a social topology — i.e., a
socially constructed and contested multi-dimensional space
defined by accumulations of various forms of social and
material capital.  Donati (1992) alludes to a similar concept. 
The metaphor of a contested terrain suggests the possi-
bility of a more profound convergence between the ecologi-
cal and constructivist traditions.  From an evolutionary per-
spective, various dimensions of the physical, biological and
social environment can be conceptualized as “adaptive land-
scapes.” The hills and valleys of such landscapes define vary-
ing levels of fitness and, thus, differential probabilities of sur-
vival and propagation for social rules, routines or organiza-
tions.6 Thus, in contrast to the above metaphors, the notion ofMcLaughlin
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an adaptive landscape has the advantage of providing a mech-
anism — differential survival — that can explain patterns of
structural change.  Such a metaphor is implicit within organi-
zational ecology. Unfortunately, the inertia metaphor has led
organizational ecologists to reify such landscapes as “natur-
al” (Perrow 1986). The result is a fairly mechanistic image of
the evolutionary process, one in which organizations are pas-
sively selected by social environments which are treated as
entirely exogenous. However, if individual and corporate
actors are continually generating alternative courses of action
and bringing those imaginative projections and the lessons of
past experience to bear on current pragmatic situations, then
it is theoretically untenable and historically inaccurate to
treat adaptive landscapes as simply “given.” Rather, as both
Bourdieu (1985) and Donati (1992) suggest, such landscapes
must themselves be seen as subject to continual construction
and reconstruction. I believe that the metaphor of a socially
constructed adaptive landscape provides a more dynamic
and historical image of the evolutionary process, one in
which more or less bounded networks of organizational
actors are conceptualized as simultaneously adapting to and
actively reshaping their environment(s). 
Such a reformulation of organizational ecology has a
number of advantages.  First, it clarifies the interrelationship
between structure, agency and environment.  For instance, it
provides an intelligible framework for answering the follow-
ing question posed by Emirbayer and Mische (1998, 964): “If
structural contexts are analytically separable from (and stand
over and against) capacities for human agency, how is it pos-
sible for actors to mediate or transform their own relationships
to these contexts?” Within a socially constructed adaptive
landscape, individual and corporate actors alter their structur-
al contexts by engaging in various discursive and claims-mak-
ing activities and by directly employing economic and politi-
cal power.  To the extent that they are successful in persuad-
ing, manipulating or dominating other actors who control var-
ious forms of social and material resources they reshape the
contours of the social dimensions of the adaptive landscape.
Actors also modify biophysical dimensions of the landscape
by deploying various technologies and associated organiza-
tional routines. In either case, such reconstructions of the evo-
lutionary terrain alter the structural contexts of action by
changing the founding and disbanding rates for social rules,
routines and organizations. Such structural shifts, in turn, cre-
ate opportunities for and impose constraints upon subsequent
action. Thus, the metaphor of a socially constructed adaptive
landscape acknowledges the centrality of agency to organiza-
tional evolution without giving agency unlimited scope (Dietz
and Burns 1992). At the same time, it retains organizational
ecology and resource mobilization theory’s emphasis on
resources as a fundamental constraint on social action.
A second advantage of this metaphor is that it allows
critical theorists’ (Fischer and Sirianni 1984) concerns with
power and conflict to be brought back into the ecological
model, while avoiding the essentialist pitfalls associated with
Marxian approaches to organizational dynamics.  Relative
power within this framework can be conceptualized in terms
of individual or corporate actors’position within the adaptive
landscape, which represents accumulations of various forms
of social and material capital (Bourdieu 1985).  Considered
in dynamic terms, power implies the ability to actively mold
the contours of the adaptive landscape. As Dietz and Burns
(1992, 266) note, powerful actors can not only determine
what rules are applied in a given situation, but, in the long
run, change the distribution of rules to favor their own inter-
ests. Questions of power and conflict also arise in relation to
the construction and deconstruction of boundaries between
organizational networks (see below).
Finally, from the perspective advocated here questions
of “why” social actors do what they do must be seen as theo-
retically on a par with questions relating to “how” actors
accomplish their objectives (Zucker 1989).  That is, if indi-
vidual and corporate actors’ perceptions of and attempts to
manipulate the adaptive landscape are guided by hierarchical
and articulated sets of “frames” (Clemens 1993; Snow et. al
1986), then questions of meaning and interests, ideology and
grievance interpretation cannot be black boxed or side-
stepped. Rather, as Emirbayer and Mische (1998) contend,
such questions must be seen as constitutive to any attempt to
understand social dynamics. In the final section of the paper,
I briefly explore the implications of such a revised version of
organizational ecology for the study of the origins, legitima-
tion and diversification of organizational forms.
From Theory to Practice
The Origins of Organizational Forms
As noted above, closed-system theorists had little to say
regarding the origins of organizational forms (Scott 1987).
Unfortunately, despite their many other contributions, organi-
zational ecologists have provided few additional insights into
this critical issue. In their empirical work, they have taken the
emergence of new forms for granted, defining the origins of
a form as coinciding with the appearance of the first organi-
zation of the population in question (Hannan and Freeman
1989). While this strategy may be adequate for purposes of
modeling the subsequent dynamics of the form, it leaves the
antecedent causal processes undergirding form emergence
unexamined.
The reformulation of organizational ecology sketched
above suggests that a complete account of form emergence
will require an understanding of the interrelationshipsMcLaughlin
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between structure, agency and environment.  Of course, it is
agency that is most conspicuously absent from organization-
al ecologists’ current accounts of form emergence.
Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) perspective implies that the
emergence of a new organizational form should coincide with
a shift towards the projective dimension of human agency.
But precisely when do such shifts in agentic orientation
occur?  Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) suggestion that such
shifts occur during “unsettled times” is similar to Snow et
al.’s (1986) argument that new forms of social movement
organizations (SMO’s) emerge when master frames can no
longer cope with changing political, economic, or environ-
mental conditions.
While Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) arguments
regarding shifts in agentic orientation and Snow et al.’s
(1986) thesis concerning frame changes provide crucial ele-
ments that are missing from organizational ecologists’
accounts of form emergence, their respective references to
“unsettled times” and “changing conditions” suggest that the
timing of such shifts may themselves be mediated by struc-
tural and environmental dynamics.  For instance, elsewhere I
(McLaughlin 1992, 1996) have argued that the origins of the
farmers’ movement in Saskatchewan Canada can only be
understood in terms of: (1) individual and corporate actors
reacting against the competitive ethos of frontier capitalism
by developing an alternative injustice frame grounded in
cooperative ideology, (2) a shift from a generalist to a less
flexible specialist cost structure among family farmers —
rather than simply crop-specialization per se as suggested by
Lipset (1968) — which was driven by an accelerating trend
toward debt-financed mechanization at the turn of the centu-
ry and (3) an unpredictable physical environment and an
unstable wheat market which kept farmers’ incomes highly
variable (Fairbairn 1989). The resulting cost-price squeeze
created a niche mismatch between the increasingly rigid cost
structures of family farms and highly variable physical and
economic environments that eventually undermined alterna-
tive explanations of farm stress or failure — e.g., attributing
failure to personal characteristics such as bad management or
a lack of hard work or to uncontrollable external forces such
as bad luck or bad weather.  Capitalism was left as the most
plausible villain.  It was thus a confluence of agentic, struc-
tural and environmental factors which forced Saskatchewan’s
farmers’ to gain the “reflective distance” (Emirbayer and
Mische 1998, 973) necessary to question the routinized
assumptions of competitive capitalism and embark on a trans-
formative “project” to reconstitute the socio-economic land-
scape of the province by constructing new niches for educa-
tional and lobbying organizations, marketing and consumer
cooperatives and a farmers’ political party.
The above arguments suggest that organizational ecolo-
gists can strengthen their accounts of form emergence by: (1)
moving beyond their current exclusive focus on structural
dynamics to consider cultural, agentic and, where relevant,
the physical-environmental dimensions of form emergence,
(2) supplementing their excellent quantitative analyses with
equally sophisticated qualitative analyses of the temporal-
relational contexts of form emergence and (3) exploring inno-
vative quantitative approaches to analyzing these same
processes. For instance, frame shifts and changes in agentic
orientation might be quantified using various new methods of
textual analysis (Roberts 1997). In the above case, analysis of
editorials and letters to farmers’ magazines might allow one
to explore whether these shifts coincided with increases in
the farm failure rates or whether there was a relationship
between changes in agentic orientation and the origins of var-
ious farmer organizations.
The Legitimation of New Forms
As in the case of form emergence, I argue that the dis-
cursive and claims-making activities of individual and corpo-
rate actors likewise play a crucial role in the legitimation of
new organizational forms.7 Organizational ecologists allude
to these concerns in their descriptions of the legitimation
process:
The process by which organizational forms gain
taken-for-granted status encompasses at least two
kinds of activity.  One is collective action by mem-
bers of the population to define, explain, and codify
its organizational form and to defend itself from
claims and attacks by rival populations.  The sec-
ond is collective learning by which effective rou-
tines and social structures become collectively fine-
tuned, codified, and promulgated. (Hannan and
Carroll 1992, 41)
It is clear from this statement and others (e.g., Carroll and
Hannan 1995; Hannan and Freeman 1989) that organization-
al ecologists see human agency, including the rhetorical activ-
ities typically studied by constructivist theorists, as central to
the legitimation process.  Although organizational ecologists
allude to this complexity, for reasons discussed above, they
typically do not analyze it. While this strategy has produced a
series of empirical studies that seem to “confirm” the density
dependence model (Singh and Lumsden 1990), these same
studies have been widely criticized for being poorly opera-
tionalized and weakly contextualized (Delacroix and Rao
1994; Baum and Powell 1995; Zucker 1989).
The above reformulation of organizational ecology sug-
gests a new direction for the analysis of legitimation, one that
recognizes the need to integrate organizational and cultural
dynamics (Baum and Powell 1995).  Rather than treatingMcLaughlin
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legitimation as an unmeasured intervening variable that is
passively driven by increases in organizational density, I
argue that legitimation should be explicitly reconceptualized
as an active social process that encompasses the social con-
struction of organizational niches and boundaries.  Individual
and corporate actors construct new organizational niches by
employing alternative discursive frames to remold the con-
tours of a socially constructed adaptive landscape. That is, by
actively modifying the social and, in some cases, biophysical
dimensions of the adaptive landscape, actors engaged in the
legitimation of a new form alter its fitness and, thereby,
produce the observed patterns of increased founding and
decreased failure rates. 
Such a reformulation exposes organizational ecology’s
current lack of a vocabulary for discussing legitimation as an
active social process.  However, as suggested above, concepts
derived from the constructivist tradition can fill this concep-
tual gap.8 For instance, the various “frame-alignment” pro-
cesses discussed by Snow et al. (1986) can be translated into
an evolutionary framework as descriptions of the reciprocal
interactions between organizational populations and their
adaptive landscapes.  In some instances, niche construction
may involve simply “frame bridging” to previously existing
social networks. In others it might involve the “frame ampli-
fication” of the latent values and beliefs of unmobilized sen-
timent pools, thereby raising the underlying landscape and
increasing the form’s fitness. In still other cases, niche con-
struction may involve “a deliberate attempt by a social actor
to create consensus among a subset of the population”
(Klandermans 1992, 78) through such processes as “frame
extension” or “frame transformation.” The former might be
visualized as a widening of an existing ridge of the adaptive
landscape to create a lateral niche whereas the latter might be
seen as an attempt to construct an entirely new hill or fold in
the landscape.
The construction of organizational niches should simul-
taneously be accompanied by the creation and closure 
of boundaries between distinct organizational networks
(Fombrun 1988; Van de Ven and Garud 1989).  That is, I
argue that a new organizational form cannot be perceived as
“natural” or “taken-for-granted” unless it is first seen as dis-
tinct. By reproblemitizing boundaries and by focusing our
attention on the discursive practices that actors use to trans-
late “nominal” distinctions into well-defined networks of
social interaction, this reformulation counterbalances organi-
zational ecologists’ tendency to “artificially separate organi-
zations from their environments” (Fombrun 1988, 230).
Likewise, questions of power and conflict are again high-
lighted. The negotiation and contestation over organizational
boundaries must be seen as a central component of the broad-
er political struggle to define the social categories through
which the world is perceived (Bourdieu 1985). As DiMaggio
(1988, 13) notes, such “institutionalizing projects” are “pro-
foundly political” and reflect “the relative power of organized
interests.”
Hannan and Freeman’s (1986) discussion of “segregat-
ing” and “blending” processes provides an excellent starting
point for the analysis of boundary formation.  Although this
provocative piece provides a natural theoretical bridge to
constructivism, in their empirical work organizational ecolo-
gists have largely ignored its implications. Moreover, Hannan
and Freeman’s discussion still places insufficient emphasis
on the role of agency and culture. Here again constructivism
can provide additional concepts. For example, the legitimat-
ing and delegitimating struggles attending boundary forma-
tion can be conceptualized using Benford’s (1993) concept of
“frame disputes.” As Benford argues, in a social movement
context, frame disputes — over diagnoses of problems, prog-
noses or solutions to problems and disagreements over the
resonance or effectiveness of various rhetorical strategies —
arise at the boundaries of movement subsectors and play a
key role in shaping a movement’s overall structure.  While
such disputes can occur at any time in the course of the evo-
lution of an organizational population, they should be partic-
ularly prevalent during the early history of new forms.
Moreover, although Benford’s concept was intended to apply
to SMO’s, I believe it should be equally applicable to other
types of business and non-business organizations. As Dally
(1991, 100) notes, “the economy, like all other spheres, is the
terrain of a political struggle, and is governed not by a single
logic but by a proliferation of discourses/language games.”
The above arguments underscore the need for organiza-
tional ecologists to revise and extend their approach to study-
ing legitimation.  Whatever its other advantages, the “density
dependence” model clearly fails to capture the historical
embeddedness and socio-political character of the legitima-
tion process. It is not enough, as Carroll and Hannan (1989,
545) contend, to simply “establish the plausibility of the
argument that legitimation drove the early (low density) evo-
lution of the population while competition dominated in the
later (high density) period.” Such plausibility is, at best, a
minimal historical standard and one that is not always met.
Thus, organizational ecologists need, first and foremost, to
supplement their quantitative analyses of legitimation with
thick historical descriptions of the rhetorical and claims-mak-
ing activities — particularly the framing processes and strate-
gies — employed in the construction of new organizational
niches.  Such analyses should likewise include detailed con-
sideration of such internal processes as the codification of
organizational routines as well as the external frame disputes
attending the creation and closure of network boundaries.
Capturing the multi-dimensional character of the legiti-McLaughlin
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mation process will also require the exploration of new quan-
titative approaches.  For instance, Baum and Powell (1995)
have argued that organizational ecologists should attempt to
measure legitimation directly. One approach, which is con-
sistent with the above perspective, is to use various measures
of print media.  For example, McLaughlin and Khawaja
(2000) use the annual count of environmental books pub-
lished to measure the increasing legitimacy of national envi-
ronmental organizations in the U.S. during the period 1895-
1994. This measure was found to be positively associated
with the founding rate even when other variables measuring
resources and changes in the political opportunity structure
were added to the model. More sophisticated approaches
using textual analysis (Roberts 1997) of newspapers or other
documents should also be explored. The latter techniques
might also be employed to explore the relationship between
legitimation and changes in resource levels and shifts in
agentic orientation.
The Diversification of Organizational Forms
Finally, I argue that merging the ecological and con-
structivist traditions is critical to understanding the broader
patterns and processes of social evolution.  As the concept of
a socially constructed adaptive landscape makes clear, the
sum total of constructive processes occurring at both the
intra- and interorganizational level continually alter both the
diversity and dynamics of organizational populations and, in
so doing, reconstitute society by altering structures of in-
equality, exploitation, domination and control (Hannan
1988). The final advantage of an ecology of social action is
that it can clarify the role that agency and culture play in such
large-scale social transformations.  That is, such a perspective
may help us to better understand how actors and the alterna-
tive meanings they espouse play an independent causal role
in history by actively reshaping collective identities, by
remolding organizational networks and boundaries and, in
the process, creating, extending and transforming organiza-
tional niches. As McLaughlin and Khawaja (2000) argue in
their analysis of the U.S. environmental movement, under-
standing the discursive activities of individual and corporate
actors is critical to unraveling the dynamics of such complex
organizational fields because they provide the critical “isolat-
ing mechanisms” which determine the heterogeneity of orga-
nizational populations (Baum and Singh 1994) and thus, in a
given temporal-relation context, the direction of social evolu-
tion. Identifying the sources of such heterogeneity is crucial
if organizational ecologists are to readdress the broader 
theoretical, historical and political concerns of the classical
theorists.
Conclusion
Organizational ecology’s inability to effectively address
questions of individual and corporate agency and interests is
symptomatic of a broader failure within the social sciences to
develop a comprehensive framework for analyzing the inter-
relationships between structure, agency and environment.
Fombrun (1988, 239) contends that organizational ecology’s
failure in this regard can be traced directly to “a lingering
allegiance to the conceptual baggage of the neo-Darwinian
frame of reference.” While I agree that organizational ecolo-
gists need to be more sensitive to the potential disanalogies
between biological and social evolution, my central con-
tention is precisely the opposite of Fombrun’s. Both organi-
zational ecology and the social sciences in general can bene-
fit greatly from a deeper understanding of the Darwinian 
revolution.
Such an understanding can, first and foremost, clarify
the sources of some of the central impasses in the social sci-
ences.  Most importantly, I argue that the inability of social
scientists to integrate structure, agency and environment can
be traced to the persistence of essentialism within the func-
tionalist, Marxian and ecological traditions and nominalism
within the constructivist tradition. Moreover, as was the case
in biology, I believe that the key to overcoming these impass-
es is a combination of population thinking and an historical
yet realist approach to categorization. This combination can-
not only provide the underpinnings of a more robust and his-
torical organizational ecology, but also has the potential to
provide a new metatheoretical foundation for the broader
social sciences.  Although the need to account for human
agency in the case of social evolution precludes any simple
translation of metatheoretical assumptions between biology
and the social sciences, I have tried to demonstrate that an
evolutionary perspective on social change is actually more
compatible with current concepts of agency than the essen-
tialistic approaches that have historically dominated social
theory. 
Finally, the concept of a socially constructed adaptive
landscape provides a framework for combining the ecological
tradition’s concerns with structure-environment interactions,
the constructivists’ focus on agency, language, and culture
and the critical tradition’s concern with power and conflict.
Such an “ecology of social action” can provide a more
dynamic, historical and critical organizational ecology, one
that addresses “the co-evolving nature of cultural understand-
ings, organizational forms, and resource constraints” (Baum
and Powell 1995, 536).  To borrow Francois Jacob’s (1982)
phrase, the goal of such a revised evolutionary paradigmMcLaughlin
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should be to reconceptualize social evolution as a continuous
dialogue between “the possible and the actual” and see actors
and the discursive practices that they bring to bear on prag-
matic situations as the focal point of that dialogue. In the con-
clusion of the paper, I have tried to suggest how this new eco-
logical paradigm can open up fresh avenues for research on
the origins, legitimation and diversification of organizational
forms. 
Endnotes
1. E-mail: pmc1701@aol.com.
2. As Sober (1980) notes, neither the vagueness of species boundaries
nor the mutability of species is, in principle, fatal to essentialism.
However, in practice many naturalists did find such arguments per-
suasive.  For instance, the arbitrariness of species boundaries was one
of the major arguments used by Darwin to justify his belief in evolu-
tion (Greenwood 1984, 53).
3. In taking variation as his theoretical starting point, Darwin may have
benefited from nominalists’focus on individual differences.  Below I
argue that extreme post-modernists are playing a similar role in shift-
ing the starting point of theory construction in the social sciences
from natural states and paths of change to variation.
4. Although Sober (1980) is correct in acknowledging Galton’s contri-
bution to population thinking, it is important to note that Galton was
a committed Social Darwinist who advocated a theory of progressive,
saltative evolution between fixed racial types.  Such a position is
inconsistent with Darwin’s theory of evolution.  In fact, Social
Darwinism represents an assimilation of Darwinian concepts back
into an essentialistic framework.  As Greenwood (1984) notes, invari-
ably such misappropriations of Darwinian concepts are made for the
purposes of legitimating some moral or political position.
5. In addition to the direct appropriation of Newtonian metaphors such
as “inertia,” organizational ecologists may also be indirectly influ-
enced by physicalist (and hence essentialist) assumptions through
their borrowing of certain mathematical models from ecology.  For
instance, two physicists,Alfred J. Lotka and Vito Volterra, created the
Lotka-Volterra equations, which play a central role in biological and
organizational ecology.  Lotka and Volterra and subsequent re-
searchers such as Raymond Pearl initially conceptualized these equa-
tions in terms that Sober (1980) would label “frame-invariant.” That
is, their goal was to create ecological “laws” which allowed a strict
separation of “internal” (genetic) and “external” (environmental) fac-
tors (Kingsland 1985).  Moreover, the latter were conceptualized as
interfering forces or obstacles while the former were assumed to be
fixed over the short-term — a methodological assumption introduced
to simplify the mathematics.  As Kingsland (1985) notes, critics con-
tended that these researchers abstracted biological populations from
their environmental and historical contexts and argued that mathe-
matical modeling needed to be supplemented with detailed natural
histories.  Others contended that a rigid separation of internal and
external factors influencing population growth was ultimately not
possible because, among other reasons, organisms significantly mod-
ified their own environments.  As Kingsland’s (1985) account makes
clear, over the course of the century, this latter, “frame-relative”
approach to population biology has gradually but not completely won
out.  My contention is that organizational ecology’s shortcomings as
currently constructed may derive from the lingering influence of the
earlier, frame-invariant, approach to population dynamics.
6. Fitness in the biological case is defined in terms of relative repro-
ductive success — i.e., the ability of one genotype to produce more
offspring that survive to adulthood than another genotype in a given
environment.  Defining fitness in the case of organizational popula-
tions is complicated by two facts.  First, although one can metaphor-
ically speak of organizational “births,” in many cases there is no
clearly defined analogue to a “parent.” Second, unlike organisms,
individual organizations can persist indefinitely and thus contribute
directly to subsequent generations.  The relative fitness of one orga-
nizational population as compared to another is thus a composite of
their respective rates of founding, merger, disbanding and change.
Organizational ecologists have typically pursued a strategy of model-
ing these rates separately rather than combining them into an overall
index of fitness (Hannan and Freeman 1989, 143).
7. Although the focus here is on evolution occurring at the organiza-
tional level of analysis, I believe that the same framework could be
used to explain the evolution of social units at lower levels of aggre-
gation — e.g., social roles or organizational routines.  For instance,
the reformulation of legitimation discussed below could be used to
move discussions of intraorganizational evolution beyond current
concerns with the impact of managerial decisions on firm “efficien-
cy” and “adaptiveness” (Burgelman and Mittman 1994), to consider
both the embeddedness of organizational roles and routines in net-
works of social and symbolic interaction (Miner 1994) and the con-
structed and contested nature of the terrains on which they evolve.
Thus, Hochschild’s (1983) account of how airline supervisors use the
“living room metaphor” to increase flight attendants’ acceptance of
work routines involving excessive emotional labor could be interpret-
ed as an instance of niche construction in which a strategy of “frame
amplification” is used by management in an attempt to increase the
fitness of that routine within the firm.  Resistance by flight attendants
might be conceptualized as an attempt to create an alternative niche,
with the conflict between the opposing routines and rhetorics result-
ing in a frame dispute.  Taylor’s (1994) analysis of the role that oppos-
ing discourses of “efficiency” and “the social firm” are playing in the
restructuring of the Mondragon Cooperative system might be inter-
preted in similar terms.  Finally, recent feminist discussions of how
“gendered spaces” (Mehta 1996) operate to restrict women’s sphere
might be reconceptualized in terms of the differential reproduction of
roles within an adaptive landscape.  Specifically, men’s greater access
to resources in many instances allows them to use a patriarchal frame
to shape the social topography and network boundaries in ways that
favor their interests.  Challenging patriarchy requires women to iden-
tify, legitimate and defend an alternative space with sufficient
resources to allow them to redefine the larger landscape (e.g., see
Campbell and The Women’s Group of Xapuri 1996).
8. Concepts derived from the constructivist literature on technology —
e.g., actor-network theory (Callon 1986; Latour 1983) — might also
be helpful here, particularly in relation to questions involving human-
environment interactions.McLaughlin
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